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Abstract
For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene.
Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors
working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g.
May (1999), Ragin (2000), Graßhoff and May (2001), Swartz (2003), Halpin (2003),
Hall (2004), Beebee (2006) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic analy-
ses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories, the paper at hand therefore re-
assesses the criticism brought forward against regularity accounts since Mackie’s famous,
yet failed, (1974) attempts at analyzing causation with recourse to regularities among types
of events. It is shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regu-
larity theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that the
prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty.
1 Introduction
A mere glance at the abundance of controversial literature on causation, published
during the past 30 years, reveals that regularity accounts of causation – until re-
cently – virtually vanished from the scene. For lack of space and interest, stud-
ies not primarily concerned with causation every now and then roughly expli-
cated our causal intuitions in terms of regularities, but hardly anybody seriously
wanting to analyze causation resorted to regularity accounts any more. Problems
encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced philoso-
phers working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning
– as e.g. May (1999), Ragin (2000), Graßhoff and May (2001), Swartz (2003),
Halpin (2003), Hall (2004), Beebee (2006) – to direct their attention back to reg-
ularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories as
can be found in May (1999) and Graßhoff and May (2001), the paper at hand will
therefore reassess the criticism brought forward against regularity accounts since
Mackie’s famous, yet failed, (1974) attempts at analyzing causation with recourse
to regularities among types of events.
Notwithstanding the skepticism encountered by Hume’s regularity theoretic
successors, there are several commonly acknowledged advantages of an analysis
of causation in terms of regularities. A regularity theoretic notion of causation
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directly mirrors central pre-theoretic intuitions with respect to the cause-effect re-
lation expressible in well-known principles as “The same cause is always accom-
panied by the same effect” or “If no cause is present, no effect occurs”.1 More-
over, the conceptual apparatus resorted to by a regularity theoretic analysis is fully
embedded within the uncontroversial and well mastered area of extensional stan-
dard logic.2 Furthermore, unlike e.g. counterfactual accounts regularity theories
straightforwardly handle cases of overdetermination. As against interventionist or
manipulatory accounts, analyses of causation in terms of regularities do not run the
risk of being anthropocentric. Contrary to probabilistic accounts, regularity theo-
ries are not compromised by paradoxical data as, for instance, generated in cases of
Simpson’s Paradox. Finally, while transference theories treat a fundamental type
of causal process, transference processes, as conceptually primitive and thus do
not attempt to provide a reductive analysis of causation, regularity accounts, prop-
erly conceived, offer the promising prospect of explicating causation in entirely
non-causal terms.
Hence, the pages to come shall review the objections that have traditionally
been raised against regularity accounts. It will be shown that most of these objec-
tions target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By outlining
ways to refute these objections it will be argued that the prevalent conviction as to
the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty – to say the least.
2 Hume’s Legacy
The philosophical core of regularity theories of causation consists of three main
tenets: (i) the causal relation is not an ontological primitive, (ii) general causation3
– causation on type level – is the primary analysandum, and (iii) universal regu-
larities among event types or factors constitute the primary analysans. There are –
at least – two causal relations, one on type and another on token level. “Drinking
is a cause of drunkenness” is a case of general causation, i.e. causation among
factors, while “Shamus’ drinking of 6 beers at noon on September 7, 2004 causes
Shamus’ drunkenness in the afternoon of September 7, 2004” relates token events
1 This is not to claim that whoever accepts these principles is thereby committed to professing a
regularity theoretic notion of causation. Rather, regularity theories directly represent these principles.
That means by stating a regularity theory as e.g. given in section 6 below, one eo ipso subscribes to
these two principles.
2 There are some analyses of causation referred to as “regularity theories” that are stated in terms
of nomic sufficiency which cannot be spelled out by means of first-order logic, but presupposes some
modal system (cf. e.g. Hausman (1998), pp. 42-43). This terminology, however, blurs the important
distinction between empiricist and modal analyses. Such as not to drop this distinction the label
“regularity theory” is reserved for pure first-order analyses in this paper.
3 There are some regularity theoretic proposals that do not subscribe to this tenet, e.g. Mackie
(1965). Some criticism raised against regularity theories over the past three decades targets this kind
of singularist account (cf. Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004), Kim (1973) or Davidson (1980 (1967))). As
the paper at hand is only concerned with regularity theories whose primary analysandum is general
causation, these singularist objections will be disregarded in the present context (cf. also section 8
below).
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and, accordingly, is a case of singular causation. A factor that is related to another
factor in terms of general causation is said to be causally relevant to the latter. For
brevity, if a first factor is causally relevant to a second factor, the first can also be
referred to as a cause of the second. Moreover, such as to avoid unnecessary ter-
minological complications, I shall often simply speak of causation whenever both
causal relations are at issue or whenever the context clarifies whether singular or
general causation is under consideration. Factors are taken to be similarity sets of
event tokens. They are sets of type identical token events, of events that share at
least one feature. Contrary to token events, event types are generic entities. When-
ever a member of a similarity set that corresponds to an event type occurs, the latter
is said to be instantiated.
According to Hume, the godfather of regularity theories, single event se-
quences are not identifiable as being of causal nature by some inherent physical
feature or property. A causal interpretation of an event sequence is warranted only
if the corresponding events, understood as spatiotemporally located tokens or par-
ticulars,4 instantiate factors one of which is related in terms of general causation to
the other. Thus, as singular causation can be straightforwardly accounted for given
an analysis of general causation, spelling out the latter relation constitutes the core
goal of a regularity theory – hence tenet (ii). For completeness, singular causation
is separately accounted for in section 8 below.
Events are symbolized by italicized minuscules a, b, etc., with variables x, y,
x1, x2, etc. running over the domain of events. Factors, on the other hand, are
symbolized by italicized capital letters A, B, etc., with variables Z, Z1, Z2 etc.
running over the domain of factors. An event type as “striking a match” (A) can
be defined as the set consisting of all token events in the extension of the predicate
“. . . is a striking of a match”, i.e. as {x : x is a striking of a match}. Factors are
negatable. The negation of a factor A is written thus: A. A is simply defined as the
complementary set of A.5
Generic causal dependencies are not one-to-one, but many-to-one dependen-
cies. Or put differently, while effects correspond to single factors, causes are
parts of whole causing complexes – complex causes. A complex cause only be-
comes causally effective if all of its constituents are co-instantiated, i.e. instanti-
ated close-by or coincidently. Coincidently instantiated factors are termed coin-
cidences. Coincidences can be seen as conjunctions of coincidently instantiated
factors A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ An, which for simplicity shall be abbreviated by a mere
4 This focus on events does not straightforwardly cover cases of causally related absences or omis-
sions. The problems posed by causal dependencies as between omitted vaccination and contracting
influenza will be neglected in the present context. They are treated in Baumgartner (forthcoming),
ch. 3. For interesting proposals on how to deal with causation among absences cf. also Collins, Hall,
and Paul (2004).
5 Instead of factors or event types one may also speak of event properties, as long as the latter
are spelled out in purely extensional terms. Since the notion of a property tends to give rise to
far-reaching questions as to the extensional definability of properties or to the existence of negative
properties (cf. Zangwill (2003)), I prefer the philosophically less biased notion of a factor.
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concatenation of the respective factors: A1A2 . . . An.6 Ordinarily, only a small
subset of members of a complex cause are known or of interest to a causal investi-
gation. VariablesX1,X2, etc. are used to run over unknown or neglected elements
of complex causes, e.g. AX1, BX2. Regularity theories subscribe to the principle
of determinism which stipulates that, if the same causes are instantiated, the same
effects occur. Expressed in the regularity theoretic terminology that yields: Causes
are sufficient for their effects, i.e. if AX1 is a complex cause of B, AX1 → B.
Moreover, instances of factors do not cause themselves – no self-causation on to-
ken level –, and effects and causes are spatiotemporally proximate – no action at a
distance.7 All of this yields a first Hume-inspired proposal for a regularity theoretic
account of causal relevance:
(I) A is causally relevant to B iff A is part of a sufficient condition AX1 of
B, i.e. AX1 → B, such that the instances of AX1 and B differ and are
spatiotemporally proximate.
Note that the relational constraints (I) imposes on the instances of factors that
are related in terms of general causation forestall a formalization of causal state-
ments by means of simple propositional conditionals. These relational constraints
can only be adequately represented by means of first-order expressions, which are
properly introduced in the appendix below. While the decisive theoretical work
as regards the analysis of causal relevance is done by regularities existing among
the factors involved in a causal structure, those relational constraints merely assure
that a suitable subset of all regularities among corresponding factors is chosen as a
starting point for causal analyses. The relational constraints delineate the causally
interesting regularities from causally meaningless regularities as “Whenever there
is a table, there is a table”, “For every first human step on the lunar surface there
is a first human non-stop balloon flight around the world”, or “Whenever there is a
soccer game, there is a sport event”. Throughout the main part of this paper propo-
sitional conditionals are used as convenient abbreviations of the causally interesting
regularities identified by the first-order expressions presented in the appendix.
3 Monotony
Implementing regularities along the lines of (I) to identify generic causal depen-
dencies does not amount to a feasible analysis of causal relevance, because there
are regularities of the required type that are not amenable to a causal interpreta-
tion. One such type of regularities is due to the law of monotony: Antecedents of
conditionals can salva veritate be conjunctively supplemented by further factors.
6 Such a mere propositional formalization of coincidences can be read in terms of “Factor A1 is
instantiated coincidently with A2 and . . . and An”.
7 Hume originally required temporal succession, not mere proximity (cf. Hume (1999 (1748)), p.
146). In accordance with the usual practice, causes and effects are here only required to be spatiotem-
porally proximate such as not to preclude the possibility of simultaneous or backward causation on
a priori grounds (cf. section 5).
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Striking a match with a certain speed and thrust, factor A, dryness of its flammable
head (B), and presence of enough oxygen (C), shall be assumed to be jointly suf-
ficient for the corresponding match to catch fire (D), i.e. ABC → D. Yet, if A,
B, and C are jointly sufficient for the match to light, the combination of ABC and
singing a song is thus sufficient, too. Or formally:
ABC → D ` ABCX → D, (1)
whereX stands for an arbitrary factor or conjunction of factors. This demonstrates
that being a part of a sufficient condition, i.e. being a conjunct within a sufficient
conjunction of factors, is by no means sufficient for being a cause of the corre-
sponding conditioned factor.
Broad (1930) has been the first to propose a solution to this problem. He does
not analyze causes to be mere parts of sufficient conditions, but rather to be non-
redundant parts of such conditions. A non-redundant part of a sufficient condition
can be spelled out – in purely logical terms8 – as a conjunct of a sufficient condi-
tion such that, if it is eliminated from that condition, the latter loses its sufficiency
for a corresponding effect. Accordingly, complex causes must be taken to be min-
imally sufficient conjunctions of factors – a minimally sufficient conjunction being
a conjunction that does not have sufficient proper parts.
(II) A is causally relevant to B iff A is part of a minimally sufficient condition
AX1 of B, i.e. (AX1 → B) ∧ ¬(A → B) ∧ ¬(X1 → B), such that the
instances of AX1 and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
Applying (II) to the match example prohibits a causal interpretation of the com-
bination of striking a match, presence of enough oxygen, dryness of the match,
and singing a song. The conjunction of these factors is merely sufficient, but not
minimally sufficient for the match to catch fire. Requiring a minimalization of
sufficient conditions in Broad’s sense precludes a causal interpretation of arbitrary
extensions of sufficient conditions based on the law of monotony.
4 Empty Regularities
Consider again the match example. The presence of oxygen, factor C, in combina-
tion with a properly struck match (A) with a dry head (B) is not the only minimally
sufficient condition of the match catching fire (D) that contains C. Another such
condition is constituted by the presence of oxygen and the absence of oxygen: CC.
A contradiction is sufficient for any factor, not only for matches catching fire, but
also for rain to fall and elephants to be born. That CC is moreover minimally suffi-
cient for a match to light can easily be verified by either removing C or C, both of
8 Not all critics of regularity accounts have taken note of these purely logical ways to minimalize
sufficient conditions. For instance, in 1970 Brand and Swain still erroneously claimed that minimal-
izing sufficient conditions cannot be accomplished in non-causal and, thus, non-circular terms (cf.
Brand and Swain (1970), p. 226).
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which is accompanied by a loss of sufficiency forD. More generally put: Material
conditionals are true if their antecedents are false or non-instantiated, or empty for
short. Any regularity statement AX1 → B whose antecedent is empty is, accord-
ingly, termed an empty regularity. Empty regularities do not only result from log-
ically non-instantiatable antecedents, but also from physically non-instantiatable
antecedents as, for instance, “Whenever Pegasus goes skiing, Lake Thun is made
of gold”.
The truth of empty regularity statements raises another often cited problem
for regularity accounts: Empty regularities are, notwithstanding their truth, not
amenable to a causal interpretation.9 The combination of absence and presence of
oxygen – CC – does not cause the sinking of Mississippi steamers, even though
CC in fact is minimally sufficient for these sinkings. Neither can Pegasus’ ski tour
be seen as a cause of the golden content of a lake.
Solutions to this problem are easily thought of. It is not the case that only a
certain proper subset of all empty regularities consists of regularities that are not
causally interpretable, rather, no empty regularities are thus interpretable. Causal
dependencies only exist among causes and effects that are instantiated in nature.
“Instantiated” in this context is not to be read in terms of “has occurred prior to
a specific moment of investigation”, but in terms of “has not occurred in all past
and will not occur in all future”.10 Factors and conjunctions of factors may not be
causally related if they have not been instantiated in all past and will not be instan-
tiated in all future. Therefore, empty regularities can straightforwardly be excluded
from causal interpretability by adding a further constraint to (II) that requires the
antecedent of causally interpretable regularities to be non-empty.11
(III) A is causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is part of a minimally sufficient condition AX1 of B,
(ii) the instances of AX1 and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate,
(iii) there is an instance of AX1.
5 Non-Symmetry
Another objection often raised against regularity accounts concerns the direction
causation. The cause-effect relation is not symmetric and this lacking symmetry is
usually claimed not to be adequately representable in regularity theoretic terms. In
order to clarify what this criticism amounts to, some conceptual preliminaries are
required. First, non-symmetry must be distinguished from asymmetry. A relation
9 Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983).
10 Cf. the tenseless use of “exist” e.g. in Russell (1986), p. 217.
11 Note that regularity theories of laws of nature are not as easily rendered immune to the empty
regularities problem as regularity theories of causation. While factors without instances may not be
claimed to be causally dependent, there may well be natural laws involving predicates with empty
extensions, as e.g. “. . . travels faster than light” (cf. Molnar (1969)).
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C is non-symmetric iff (2) holds and asymmetric iff (3) holds.12
¬∀x∀y(Cxy → Cyx) or equivalently ∃x∃y(Cxy ∧ ¬Cyx) (2)
∀x∀y(Cxy → ¬Cyx) (3)
Every asymmetric relation with a non-empty extension is also non-symmetric, but
not vice versa. Predicating asymmetry of a non-empty relation is a much stronger
claim than predicating non-symmetry of it. It is undisputed that both general and
singular causation are non-symmetric relations. There exist both general and sin-
gular causal dependencies and neither “A is causally relevant to B” implies “B
is causally relevant to A” nor “a causes b” implies “b causes a”. Moreover, gen-
eral causation clearly is not asymmetric, for there are event types that are causally
relevant to themselves, as e.g. in causal cycles. For instance, with increasing un-
employment the consumption of the population is reduced. This causes decreased
profits on the side of the employers, which, in turn, causes them to lay off even
more people. Thus, the unemployment increases anew. In contrast, on token level
there are no events that cause themselves. Contrary to general causation, singular
causation is irreflexive. Yet, whether it is moreover asymmetric is a question that
is controversially disputed in the literature. If event a is a cause of event b, does
it follow that b is not a cause of a? Is there reciprocal causation on token level?13
For the purposes at hand this question can be postponed until section 8, for a reg-
ularity theory that focuses on general causation primarily needs to account for the
latter’s non-symmetry. In consequence, the criticism against regularity theories to
the effect that they are not capable of adequately capturing the direction of causa-
tion amounts to the claim that the non-symmetry of general causation cannot be
mirrored on regularity theoretic grounds. And indeed, prima facie there appears to
be a problem.
A being causally relevant to B neither implies B being causally relevant to A
nor B being causally relevant to A. However, by contraposition A → B is a true
regularity statement iff B → A is so too. Which of these conditionals is to be
causally interpreted? It is certainly not the case that a factor is causally relevant
to another factor iff the negation of the latter is causally relevant to the negation
of the former. Accordingly, many critics of regularity theories have claimed that
regularity accounts cannot adequately distinguish between causes and effects.14
(III) identifies A to be a cause of B iff it identifies B to be cause of A, which
indicates that we have not come up with an adequate analysis of causal relevance
yet.
Satisfactorily mirroring the non-symmetry of general causation is an intricate
problem not only faced by regularity accounts, but by virtually all presently known
12 This terminology corresponds to logical and mathematical conventions (cf. e.g. Lemmon (1978
(1965)), pp. 180-182). In addition to non-symmetry and asymmetry a relation may lack symmetry in
terms of antisymmetry. A relation C is antisymmetric iff ∀x∀y(x 6= y ∧ Cxy → ¬Cyx).
13 Cf. Eells (1991), ch. 5, Hausman (1998), pp. 44-47.
14 Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983), ch. 2.
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theories of causation. Normally the direction of causal relevance is accounted for
with recourse to some non-symmetry that is external to the conceptual framework
used in the analysans of causal relevance as – most prominently – the direction of
time or human manipulation and intervention.15 Applied to the regularity theory
considered here, this could possibly mean that conditionals in the sense of (III)
are causally interpretable only if the instances of the antecedent precede the in-
stances of the consequent. Along these lines, one of A → B and B → A could
be excluded from causal interpretability. However, spelling out the non-symmetry
of general causation by means of the direction of time presupposes that the latter
is accounted for independently of the direction of causation, which runs counter
to an often adopted program in the philosophy of time that takes the direction of
causation to be primary.16 Furthermore, a temporal account of the direction of
causal relevance would stipulate that simultaneous and backward causation are im-
possible on mere conceptual grounds. Yet, while simultaneous causation seems
to be a physical possibility, backward causation, if impossible at all, is thought to
be excluded on physical grounds. Resorting to manipulation, on the other hand,
relativizes the non-symmetry of general causation to human intervention, where,
intuitively, this non-symmetry seems to be perfectly independent of human exis-
tence. Causal processes – as planetary movements or volcanic eruptions on Saturn
– that are not manipulable by humans are non-symmetric and can be oriented just
as everyday earthly processes as the breaking of a window or the starting of a car
engine which are open to human intervention. Moreover, it is unclear how the
notions of agency, intervention, and manipulation could be clarified without re-
course to causation. In fact, these notions seem to straight-out presuppose clarity
on causation.
This is a generalizable consequence of implementing any external non-
symmetry for a theoretical account of the non-symmetry of general causation:
The external non-symmetry becomes more basic than causal relevance. Thereby
a straightforward causal analysis of these external non-symmetries is blocked. As
long as we are not inevitably constrained to an analysis of the direction of causal
relevance by means of an external non-symmetry, theoretical prudence calls for
abstinence from recourse to such non-symmetries. Indeed, regularity theories are
capable of capturing the direction of general causation without recourse to non-
symmetries that are external to the conceptual framework of a regularity theoretic
analysans of causal relevance.
General causation can be oriented on mere logical grounds. Roughly, while
conditional dependencies among single factors cannot be attributed a direction
without resorting to external non-symmetries, complex nets of such dependencies
can be oriented based on existing regularities only. There are several alternative
causes for each effect. A match can be lit by either striking it against a match box,
15 Cf. e.g. Suppes (1970) or Price (1992). Temporal order, of course, is not only non-symmetric in
the above sense, but moreover asymmetric.
16 Cf. e.g. Reichenbach (1956).
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by exposing it to fire or to a flammable chemical etc. Accordingly, causally in-
terpretable regularities are far more complex than expressed by (III). Rather than
merely one minimally sufficient condition, many alternative minimally sufficient
conditions must be invoked for each effect. Moreover, regularity theories presup-
pose a weak principle of causality, which determines instances of effects not to
occur without at least one of their causes.17 These mutual dependencies among
causes and effects are tentatively expressible by means of a biconditional as in
(4).18
ACD ∨ EFG ∨HIJ ↔ B (4)
Each complex cause of B is minimally sufficient for B, while the disjunction of
all alternative causes is necessary for B.19 Ordinarily, only a small subset of the
alternative causes involved in an investigated causal structure are known or of in-
terest to that investigation. Below, variables YA1 , YA2 , etc. will be used to run over
unknown or neglected elements of alternative causes of effects A1 and A2, respec-
tively, but, for simplicity, let us here assume thatACD, EFG, andHIJ constitute
all alternative causes of B.
(4) is non-symmetric with respect to the factors to the left and the right of “↔”.
The instantiation of a particular disjunct is minimally sufficient for B, but not vice
versa. B does not determine a particular disjunct to be instantiated.20 B only
determines the whole disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions. Hence, given
that an instantiation ofACD is observed, it can be inferred that there is an instance
of B somewhere in the corresponding spatiotemporal neighborhood. On the other
hand, if an instance ofB is observed, no such inference to a proximate instantiation
of ACD is possible. The observed instance of B might well have been caused by
EFG. This non-symmetry corresponds to the non-symmetry of determination. It
induces a specification of (III) along the following lines:
(IV) A is causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition AX1 of B,
(ii) AX1 is a disjunct contained in a disjunction AX1 ∨ X2 ∨ . . . ∨ Xn,
n ≥ 2, of other minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that AX1 ∨
X2 ∨ . . . ∨Xn is necessary for B,
(iii) the instances of AX1 ∨X2 ∨ . . .∨Xn and B differ and are spatiotem-
porally proximate,
(iv) there is an instance of AX1, X2, . . . , and of Xn.
17 While a weak principle of causality only claims that no instances of effects are uncaused, a strong
variant of this principle holds that no events are uncaused.
18 (4) is a mere tentative formal representation, for, as mentioned in section 2, propositional logic
does not allow for adequately expressing the relational constraints implicit in causal regularities in
the sense of (III) (cf. appendix A for details on the first-order representation of these constraints).
19 This essentially corresponds to Mackie’s (1974) famous analysis of causation in terms of so-
called INUS-conditions. Mackie (1974) will not be given an in-depth review in the present context.
This has been done in Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), ch. 5.
20 Cf. Graßhoff and May (2001), pp. 97-99. Similar analyses of the direction of causation have
been proposed in Russell (1992 (1913)), p. 199, Sanford (1976) or Hausman (1998).
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Clearly though, by contraposition (4) is equivalent to
B ↔ ¬(ACD) ∧ ¬(EFG) ∧ ¬(HIJ) (5)
However, in view of the fact that effects have several alternative causes, (IV) re-
stricts the causal interpretability of complex regularity statements to one specific
syntactical form. Within a set of logically equivalent regularity statements, only
expressions with a syntax that exhibits alternative minimally sufficient conditions
as disjuncts of a necessary condition are causally interpretable. Applied to (4) and
(5), this syntactical constraint prohibits a causal interpretation of (5), for it does not
render an underlying causal structure transparent in the sense just delineated.21
(4) and (5) are moreover equivalent to a biconditional that results from (5) by
factoring out and bringing the right-hand side back into disjunctive normal form:
AEH ∨AEI ∨ . . . ∨DGJ ↔ B (6)
In contrast to (5), (6) is unproblematically causally interpretable. While (4) iden-
tifies three minimally sufficient conditions as complex causes of B, (6) establishes
the causally interpretable minimally sufficient conditions of B. Each of those con-
ditions amounts to a conjunction consisting of the negation of exactly one conjunct
of each disjunct of (4). Furthermore, (6) does not reverse the direction of the de-
pendencies expressed in (4). Both identify B and B, respectively, as effects and
the other factors as causes. Thus, there is one regularity statement complying to the
syntactical constraints imposed by (IV) for a positive effect and one for the latter’s
negative complement. Both of these regularities exhibit the same non-symmetry.
Accordingly, neither of them poses a problem for (IV).
It might be objected that, while effects have multiple alternative causes, causes
likewise could have multiple alternative effects. That means the following bicon-
ditional could be argued to describe a causal structure as well:
ACD ∨ EFG ∨HIJ ↔ B1 ∨B2 (7)
Apparently, if a causal interpretation of (7) is in fact warranted, cause and effect
factors cannot be discriminated by means of the non-symmetry of determination
resorted to in (IV). (7) is perfectly symmetric as regards determination of one side
of the biconditional by the other: No factors on either side determine any other fac-
tors. For example, according to (7) ACD can be instantiated in combination with
B1B2 or with B1B2. The analogue holds for, say, B1 which is claimed to occur
with either ACD or EFG or HIJ by (7). If (7) is causally interpreted, the prin-
ciple of determinism is violated, for it is then no longer guaranteed that causes are
always accompanied by the same effects. (7) can only be seen to represent a causal
21 The fact that logically equivalent expressions differ with respect to the straightforwardness of
their causal interpretation is analogous to the fact that divergent normal forms differ with respect
to how transparent they render truth conditions of logical formulae. For instance, it is much more
intricate to read off truth conditions from prenex normal forms than, say, from normal forms with
minimal quantifier scopes (cf. Hintikka (1973)).
Regularity Theories Reassessed 11
structure if it is implicitly presupposed that causes are sometimes accompanied by
a first effect and sometimes by a second. Indeed, a causal structure as stipulated by
a causal interpretation of (7) could not be oriented in the vein of (IV). As to (IV) it
is completely indeterminate which side of the biconditional in (7) is seen to contain
causes and effects, respectively. As indicated in the introductory section, however,
regularity theories presuppose causation to be a deterministic relation. Against the
background of this presupposition, a causal interpretation of (7) is not warranted
in the first place. Only biconditionals featuring a single factor on one side can be
seen to represent deterministic causal structures.
A successful discrimination between causes and effects in the vein of (IV) pre-
supposes the validity of the principle of determinism. The vast majority of theories
of causation indeed take causation to be deterministic. For, even though the exis-
tence of irreducibly indeterministic processes is hardly challengeable according to
standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, there are many open questions –
as for instance raised by phenomena of the EPR type22 – with respect to the causal
interpretability of these processes. The fact that not even modern probabilistic
theories of causation can successfully account for a causal nature of irreducibly
indeterministic processes casts further doubt on the causal interpretability of such
processes.23 For lack of space, the metaphysical question as to the validity of the
principle of determinism cannot be properly addressed here. All that matters for
our purposes is that symmetric biconditionals as (7) cannot be seen to represent de-
terministic causal structures and that, accordingly, the direction of a deterministic
causal relation can be successfully accounted for by drawing on the non-symmetry
of determination between cause and effect factors. If it should turn out that there
are irreducibly indeterministic causal processes after all, the non-symmetry of such
processes would have to be analyzed along different lines.
Accounting for the non-symmetry of general causation in the vein of (IV) has
an important implication as regards the minimal complexity of causal structures. A
factor or conjunction of factorsX1, that is both minimally sufficient and necessary
for another factor or conjunction of factorsX2, cannot be identified as cause ofX2,
for X2 would be minimally sufficient and necessary for X1 as well. All empirical
evidence such a dependency structure would generate are perfectly correlated in-
stantiations of X1 and X2 – both would either be co-instantiated or absent. Such
empirical data is not causally interpretable. It must be emphasized, however, that,
while generic causal structures can be uncovered only given data that meets certain
minimal diversity constraints, no such requirements must be satisfied in order to
22 Cf. van Fraassen (1989).
23 Irreducibly indeterministic processes violate central assumptions of probabilistic analyses of the
cause-effect relation, as the Reichenbachian common cause principle or the causal Markov assump-
tion (cf. Reichenbach (1956) and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000 (1993))). In consequence,
probabilistic accounts are forced to limit their scope to so-called pseudo-indeterministic processes,
i.e. processes whose indeterminacy is merely due to incomplete knowledge of or control over the
involved factors (cf. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000 (1993)), or Cartwright (1999)).
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detect causal dependencies on token level. Normally, effect events are not overde-
termined. Hence, in their particular situations of occurrence cause events are both
sufficient and necessary for their effect events. Token causes and effects cannot be
discriminated by means of the non-symmetry of determination. Instead, they can
be kept apart by drawing on the generic causal structures they instantiate. Once the
non-symmetry of general causation is accounted for, a token event a can be identi-
fied as a cause of an event b if a and b instantiate two factorsA andB, respectively,
such that A is a type level cause of B.24
Contrary to the widespread opinion in the literature, regularity theories are
not only capable of adequately capturing the non-symmetry of general causation,
but moreover offer the prospect of successfully doing so without resorting to non-
symmetries external to the conceptual framework implemented in their analysans
of causation. Against this background, such external non-symmetries as the di-
rection of time or of human intervention remain amenable to a straightforward
analysis in terms of the direction of causal relevance.
6 Spurious Regularities
One of the most widespread criticisms against regularity theories stems from so-
called spurious regularities.25 Consider two parallel effects A and B of a common
cause C and assume, for simplicity’s sake, that C in fact is minimally sufficient
for A and B. Let us suppose furthermore that there exists one minimally sufficient
alternative cause for A and B each – D for A and E for B. All in all, the causal
structure under consideration thus is assumed to be of a form as depicted in figure 1.
In this constellation,A in combination with the absence ofD, i.e.AD, is minimally
sufficient for B without AD being a complex cause of B. Whenever AD occurs,
C is present as well, for no effect occurs without any of its causes. Hence, if D is
absent, C must be present to account for A. Furthermore, since C is taken to be
sufficient for B, it follows that AD is sufficient for B as well. Of course, AD is
moreover part of a necessary condition of B:
AD ∨ C ∨ E ↔ B (8)
B
ED
A
C
Fig. 1: A common cause structure that gives rise to spurious regularities.
24 This only indicates the general idea behind a regularity theoretic analysis of singular causation.
For details see section 8.
25 Cf. e.g. Cartwright (1989), pp. 25-29.
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According to (IV), (8) is a regularity statement that is causally interpretable. This
clearly is an unacceptable consequence, for, as mentioned above, relative to the
construction of the structure in figure 1, AD is not causally relevant to B.
Structures as the one under consideration are ubiquitous. The most famous
concrete example of this type is the so-called Manchester-Factory-Hooters exam-
ple based on which Mackie (1974) ultimately abandoned the attempt to provide a
genuine regularity theoretic analysis of general causation.26 Examples of this type
unmistakably demonstrate that necessary conditions, just as sufficient conditions,
may contain redundant factors. A being necessary for B implies that A ∨ C is
necessary for B. Or formally:
B → A ` B → A ∨ C (9)
Any true conditional stays true if any (true or false) disjunct is added to its conse-
quent. Analogous to the case of sufficient conditions, the extendability of necessary
conditions by arbitrary disjuncts forecloses a causal interpretability of necessary
conditions. A causal interpretation of necessary conditions is only warranted if the
conditions exclusively contain factors that are essential to the bringing about of the
purported effect. Arbitrary factors as C in (9) or conditions as AD in (8) must –
even if they are minimally sufficient – not be incorporated in causally interpretable
necessary conditions.
A solution to this problem that is analogous to the solution of the difficulties
induced by monotony as been proposed in Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004): Nec-
essary conditions must be minimalized. The latter are minimalized analogously to
sufficient conditions: A necessary condition is minimally necessary iff it does not
contain a necessary proper part. Minimalizing necessary conditions in this vein
eliminates just the spurious minimally sufficient conditions as AD from complex
regularity statements as (8). In order to see this, consider again the structure de-
picted in figure 1: Whenever B is given, C or E is instantiated. Thus, C ∨ E is
necessary forB. The antecedent of (8) has no other necessary proper part. AD∨C
is not necessary, for there are instances of B without AD and C being instantiated
– say, when AD is given along with C and E. Neither is AD ∨ E necessary for
B: There are instances of B without instances of AD and E occurring – for ex-
ample, when AD is given in combination with E and C. Among the elements of
the necessary condition of B mentioned in (8) the following non-symmetry holds,
which allows for eliminating AD: AD is sufficient for C ∨ E, while C ∨ E is
not sufficient for AD. That means, C ∨ E is a minimally necessary disjunction of
minimally sufficient conditions of B, or formally:
(C ∨ E → B) ∧ (B → C ∨ E) ∧ ¬(B → C) ∧ ¬(B → E) (10)
Reflecting this maximal minimalization, minimally necessary disjunctions of
minimally sufficient conditions of a given factor are labelled minimal theories of
26 Cf. Mackie (1974), pp. 83-87, Cartwright (1989), pp. 25-29. In Baumgartner and
Graßhoff (2004), pp. 99-103, we discuss the Manchester-Hooters in all detail along with a solution
to this problem.
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that factor. A minimal theory of a factor B is a minimally necessary disjunction φ
of minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that (a) φ contains at least two dis-
juncts, (b) conjuncts in each disjunct are coincidently instantiated, (c) B is instan-
tiated in the spatiotemporal neighborhood of its minimally sufficient conditions,
and (d) the instances of B differ from the instances of its minimally sufficient
conditions. The operator “⇒” is introduced to abbreviate the formal expression
corresponding to minimal theories as (10):27
C ∨ E ⇒ B (11)
C ∨E is the antecedent of the minimal theory (11) and B its consequent. A factor
Z is said to be part of a minimal theoryΦ iff Z is a conjunct of at least one disjunct
in the antecedent of Φ.
The notion of a minimal theory, however, is not itself sufficient to solve the
problem posed by spurious regularities. For a proper minimalization of necessary
conditions is always dependent on the availability of the proper minimally suffi-
cient conditions involved in an investigated causal structure. This availability may
well not be guaranteed at the beginning of a causal investigation. Analyses of
causal structures must be relativized to the set of examined factors, which shall be
referred to as the factor frame of the analysis. Ordinarily, factor frames are grad-
ually expanded in the course of investigating a structure. Suppose the scientific
discipline investigating the causal structure depicted in figure 1 first discovers that
AD and E are minimally sufficient for B. At the same time, the scientists con-
cerned withB are confronted with instances ofB in situations where bothAD and
E are absent. We who know the actual structure behind B, of course, can easily
account for these cases: They are cases in which D, C, B, E, and A are instanti-
ated. At this stage of scientific knowledge, however, the corresponding discipline
will conjecture the validity of the following minimal theory featuring the variable
YB which runs over the unknown alternative causes of B:28
AD ∨ E ∨ YB ⇒ B (12)
After a while of further investigation it is discovered that the formerly unknown
factorC constitutes an additional minimally sufficient condition ofB, i.e. the factor
frame of the causal analysis at hand is extended. Moreover, now the scientists can
account for all instances of B. That means, whenever B is instantiated, there is an
instance of AD, C, or E. Thus, a necessary condition of B has been discovered.
This finding immediately raises the question as to whether this necessary condition
is minimal. A disjunctive integration of C into the antecedent of (12) yields:
AD ∨ C ∨ E (13)
27 Cf. Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), ch. 5. For details on the first-order form of minimal
theories see the appendix A.4 below.
28 Cf. appendix A.4 for detailed introduction of Yx-variables.
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Yet, as we have seen above, (13) is not a minimally necessary condition of B.
Upon the discovery of C, AD becomes redundant and accordingly drops out of a
minimalized necessary condition. Hence, extensions of factor frames can directly
affect the membership of a condition in a minimal theory. The fact that AD is
part of (12) does not guarantee that AD remains a constituent of every minimal
theory resulting from extending the factor frame of (12). Therefore, despite all
their causally interpretable features, minimal theories are not directly causally in-
terpretable. A minimal theory is causally interpretable only if its factors stay part
of that minimal theory across all extensions of the corresponding factor frame.
The fact that the causal interpretability of a minimal theory cannot be deter-
mined before its factor frame is fully expanded raises the question as to the status of
minimal theories prior to a complete expansion of their factor frames. May (1999),
p. 74, has pointed to an important feature of redundant minimally sufficient con-
ditions as AD that allows for their identification prior to an exhaustive expansion
of respective factor frames. Redundant minimally sufficient conditions all con-
tain causally dependent factors that cannot be absent at the same time, i.e. factors
that are subcontrary. A and D are causally dependent in the structure of figure 1.
Against the background of that structure, these two factors cannot both be absent.
IfA is not instantiated, i.e. if there is an event of typeA, there cannot be an event of
typeD, thusD cannot be absent, and ifD is not instantiated, i.e. ifD is present, A
cannot be absent. Such causal dependencies among factors of minimally sufficient
condition are ‘minimalized away’ as respective factor frames are extended.
Apart from a relativization of causal reasoning to a given factor frame the mini-
malization of necessary conditions induced by the problem of spurious regularities
calls for a distinction between direct and indirect causal relevance. For all indi-
rect causes of an effect as B in figure 1 are redundant in a minimally necessary
condition of B. Nonetheless, indirect causes are causally relevant to their indirect
effects. Suppose, we introduce two alternative direct causes of C into the structure
of figure 1: F and G shall each be minimally sufficient for C. As direct causes
of C, F and G are indirect causes of B. However, (11) does not allow for an in-
tegration of further factors. Both F and G imply C ∨ E while the converse does
not hold, thus, both F andG are redundant in a necessary condition of B featuring
C ∨ E.
Yet, even though causal relevancies cannot be directly read off minimal the-
ories, the latter constitute the core of the conceptual inventory needed for a suc-
cessful regularity theoretic handling of spurious regularities. While membership
in minimal theories that resists factor frame extensions accounts for direct causal
relevance, the transitive closure thereof accounts for indirect relevance:
(V) (a) A is directly causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a part of a minimal theory Φ of B,
(ii) A stays part of Φ across all extensions of its factor frame.
(b) A is indirectly causally relevant to B iff there is a sequence of factors
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Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn, n ≥ 3, such that A = Z1, B = Zn, and for each i,
1 ≤ i < n: Zi is directly causally relevant to Zi+1 in terms of (Va).
As May (1999), pp. 67-68, has shown, introducing a minimality constraint on
necessary conditions has a very important existential implication that allows for
dropping condition (iv) of (IV): C ∨ E being minimally necessary for B implies
there being an instance of B without a corresponding instance of C – refer to
this scenario as S1 – and an instance of B without a corresponding instance of
E – scenario S2. That is, none of the two disjuncts is itself necessary for B.
Nonetheless the disjunction as a whole is necessary for B. Therefore, both in S1
and in S2 there must be an instance of C ∨ E. Since in S1, by assumption, there
is no event of type C, there must be an event of type E – and vice versa for S2.
This finding is generalizable: Every disjunct of a minimally necessary condition is
instantiated at least once along with the corresponding effect, when all the other
disjuncts are absent.
7 Single-Case and Other Accidental Regularities
The problem induced by spurious regularities is not the only objection raised
against regularity theories of type (IV) in the literature. A problem for (IV) that is
closely related to the problem of empty regularities has e.g. been raised by Arm-
strong (1983).29 A conditional turns out true if both its antecedent and consequent
are true. Thus, if antecedent and consequent of a conditional each report the occur-
rence of a singular event that actually has occurred, the conditional as a whole is
true. Therefore, Armstrong argues, a regularity as required by a regularity theory
exists among any two factors with a single instance each, irrespective of whether
they are causally related or not. No doubt, a conditional as “Whenever Nero sets
fire on Rome, the Titanic sinks” is true and, no doubt, we are not prepared to hold
Nero causally responsible for the sinking of the Titanic. Hence, Armstrong’s ar-
gument continues, not only empty, but also these so-called single-case regularities
pose a serious problem for a regularity theory.
At first, it must be pointed out that the plain truth of a conditional as “When-
ever Nero sets fire on Rome, the Titanic sinks” does not suffice to identify Nero’s
setting fire on Rome as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic according to any of
the regularity theoretic accounts (I) to (V) considered thus far. For these accounts
not only require causes and effects to satisfy a material conditional, but moreover
to be proximately instantiated. More is said about spatiotemporal proximity in ap-
pendix A.1. However, relative to any pre-theoretic understanding of that notion it
seems plain that Nero’s setting fire on Rome and the sinking of the Titanic can-
not be seen as proximate events. This shortcoming of Armstrong’s argument is
easily remedied. Assume that Harold Bride, the junior wireless operator on the
Titanic, for the first (and only) time in his life lit a Havana cigar moments before
29 Cf. Armstrong (1983), pp. 15-17, similarly Mellor (1995), p. 15, or Hausman (1998), p. 42.
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the ship hit the iceberg. The conditional “Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana,
the Titanic sinks” is true and, moreover, the instances of its antecedent and conse-
quent are spatiotemporally proximate. Of course, Bride’s lighting of a Havana is
not only sufficient, but moreover minimally sufficient for the Titanic to sink. The
antecedent of the above regularity statement does not comprise a sufficient proper
part. Furthermore, Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not the only minimally sufficient
condition of the sinking of the Titanic. The latter’s real cause constituted by the
collision with the iceberg amounts to another such condition. Hence, there is a
necessary condition of the sinking of the Titanic that contains Bride’s lighting of
a Havana as a minimally sufficient disjunct. This suffices to refine Armstrong’s
argument such that it does justice to the complexity of causal structures as required
by (IV): Any two factors with exactly one instance each, such that these instances
are spatiotemporally proximate, satisfy a regularity as required by (IV), yet by no
means all thus related factors are related in terms of causal relevance as well. Con-
sequently, (IV) does not amount to a sufficient condition for causal relevance.
That (IV) is unsuited as analysans of causal relevance has already been demon-
strated by the problem of spurious regularities. In order for Armstrong to succeed
in establishing that single-case regularities prove the fundamental defectiveness of
regularity accounts, his argument must be tailored to be directed against (V). It
must be shown that Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not only contained in a nec-
essary condition of the sinking of the Titanic, but moreover is a non-redundant
part of a causally interpretable minimally necessary condition thereof, i.e. that it is
part of a minimal theory of the Titanic’s sinking. Furthermore, it must be shown
that Bride’s lighting of a Havana stays part of that minimal theory across all factor
frame extensions.
Before this further refinement will be attempted a possible objection against
Armstrong’s argument has to be considered. Antecedent and consequent of
“Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks” involve proper
names or, if formal explications by means of definite descriptions are preferred,
predicates that apply to single events only – more generally: local predicates, i.e.
predicates that involve spacetime coordinates or singular terms. The admissibility
of local predicates in contexts of general causation, as is well known, is commonly
denied in the literature. The regularity under consideration here shall therefore be
rephrased in non-local terms. Let us grant that “Whenever Harold Bride lights a
Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks” represents the exact same single-case regularity
as “Whenever a person with genome s lights a Havana cigar, an ocean liner with
molecular structure t sinks”, or formally S → T .
The Titanic’s collision with the iceberg, of course, is expressible by means of
non-local predicates as well. Symbolizing this (non-locally defined) collision by
C we get the following true biconditional that is causally interpretable according
to (IV):
S ∨ C ↔ T (14)
If S ∨ C is not merely necessary, but moreover both minimally necessary for T
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and resistant against factor frame extensions, (14) not only refutes (IV), but also
(V). S ∨ C, however, does not amount to a minimally necessary condition of
T . There is only one single instance of each factor involved in (14). Whenever
T occurs, both S and C are present nearby. Thus, the antecedent of (14) can be
further minimalized:
S ↔ T (15)
C ↔ T (16)
Neither (15) nor (16), however, correspond to minimal theories, for these expres-
sions merely report a perfect correlation of T and S and C. Any of these factors
is given if and only if the other two factors are given as well. Such perfect cor-
relations, as we have seen above, are not causally interpretable, for none of the
involved factors is identifiable as cause and effect, respectively. Since (V) requires
causally interpretable regularities to specify minimally necessary conditions of a
certain minimal complexity, neither (15) nor (16) is amenable to a causal interpre-
tation according to (V). That, however, does not mean that (V) does not allow for
identifying the collision with the iceberg as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic.
The impossibility to causally interpret either (15) or (16) merely indicates that the
events involved in the sinking of the Titanic are typecast in an overly fine-grained
manner. Causal structures can only be unfolded when a sufficient amount of com-
parable test situations are available. Thus, the Titanic’s sinking must be placed in
a broader context, it must be typecast in a more coarse-grained fashion, e.g. as a
sinking of an ocean liner. Such a typing will immediately yield far more instances
for each causal factor, which, in turn, will suspend biconditional dependencies as
in (15) or (16). If not only the Titanic’s sinking, but ocean liner sinkings are taken
into consideration, many cigar lightings will be found that are in no way followed
by a sinking ocean liner, whereas collisions with icebergs either retain their suf-
ficiency for ocean liner sinkings or a subsequent expansion of the corresponding
factor frame will reveal them to be parts of minimally sufficient conditions of such
sinkings. Even within an extended factor frame, cigar lightings, on the other hand,
will not turn out to be non-redundant parts of sufficient conditions of ocean liner
sinkings.
As mentioned before, a regularity theoretic analysis of causal relevance along
the lines of (V) imposes important minimal complexity constraints on causal struc-
tures. Causal structures are not one-to-one dependencies. Every effect has sev-
eral alternative complex causes. In order to establish such dependencies, a certain
amount of diversity in the empirical data is called for. Without such diversity no
causal diagnosis is possible. The successful discovery of causal structures within
any available theory of causation essentially hinges on the quality of the available
data. The regularity theoretic notion of causal relevance expressed in (V) mirrors
these minimal complexity requirements and, accordingly, is not affected by the
problem of single-case regularities.
The smaller the set of instances of a factor, the higher the chances that acci-
dental regularities as in the Titanic case exist. However, single-case regularities
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only constitute a special type of accidental regularities. Regularities that are not
causally interpretable also appear in many-case scenarios. In order to consider
whether accidental regularities of the many-case type pose a problem for (V), let
us somewhat modify the shipwreck example. Suppose Shamus and Fennella both
are proud owners of a sailboat. Moreover, independently of each other they both
are hit by a storm, factor H , while sailing out in the lake, to the effect that both of
their boats sink. To the sinking of a sailboat we shall refer byW . During the storm
they both stumble, are thrown against the railings of their boats and lose their left
maxillary central incisors. Shamus’ mishap shall be labeled I and Fennella’s J . As
humans can lose specific incisors only once, the following regularities hold for our
two exemplary shipwrecks: Whenever Shamus or Fennella lose their left maxillary
central incisors, there is a sinking of a sailboat, or formally
I ∨ J →W (17)
The converse, i.e.W → I ∨J , does not hold. There are many sinkings of sailboats
without instances of either I or J . Thus, this example does not feature bicondi-
tional dependencies as in the Titanic case. Moreover, as there are two alternative
minimally sufficient conditions ofW , the minimal complexity constraints imposed
on causal structures by (V) are met. Does (17), hence, express accidental regulari-
ties that erroneously have to be causally interpreted according to (V)?
(17) is not a minimal theory of W , for, as mentioned above, it does not cover
all instances ofW . Most sailboats sink when there is a storm without loss of teeth.
Moreover, there are countless further alternative causes of shipwrecks, for instance
fires or collisions with icebergs. If these further causes are all represented by the
variable YW , we get the following biconditional dependency:
I ∨ J ∨H ∨ YW ↔W (18)
If (18) is a minimal theory involving factors that are resistant to factor frame ex-
tensions, (18) must be causally interpreted according to (V), which, as a conse-
quence, would be seriously defective. (18), however, is not a minimal theory of
W . I ∨ J ∨ H ∨ YW is not minimally necessary for W ; it contains a necessary
proper part, viz. H ∨ YW . Whenever either Shamus or Fennella lose their incisors
there is a storm, thus I ∨J → H . Due to this dependency I and J are redundant in
necessary conditions containing H . That means the real causes of an effect render
conditions, that are merely accidentally minimally sufficient, redundant in mini-
mal theories.30 The minimalization of necessary conditions as demanded by (V)
not only precludes spurious regularities from a causal interpretation but also acci-
dental regularities. A regularity theory in the vein of (V) is not forced to causally
interpret accidental regularities of the many-case type.
30 Cf. Graßhoff and May (2001), pp. 107-108.
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8 Singular Causation
The problem posed by single-case regularities demonstrates that a regularity the-
ory cannot be successful if its primary analysans is taken to be singular causation,
i.e. causation among token events. Directly accounting for singular causation by
means of sufficient and necessary conditions inevitably generates a host of acci-
dental regularities whose causal interpretation can hardly be avoided without re-
sorting to some form of nomic sufficiency or necessity and, thus, without leaving
the uncontroversial path of first-order languages. In contrast, the previous sections
have shown that the complexity of generic causal structures imposes important
additional constraints on causal dependencies on type level which allow for distin-
guishing between accidental and causal regularities. Nonetheless, some regularity
theories, as e.g. developed in Mackie (1965), aim to analyze singular causation
by means of first-order sufficient and necessary conditions. In consequence, a lot
of the criticism raised against regularity theories over the past three decades tar-
gets this kind of singularist account. In addition to their inability to avoid a causal
interpretation of accidental regularities it has, for instance, been claimed that sin-
gularist regularity theories cannot properly deal with so-called preempted potential
causes.31 As the regularity theory presented in this paper, however, focuses on
general causation from the outset, the singularist thread in the literature can be
neglected here.
Rather than discussing the problems encountered by an analysis of singular
causation in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions, the argument of this paper
shall be concluded by indicating how singular causation can be accounted for by
drawing on a regularity theoretic account of general causation as given in (V). The
basic idea behind the identification of token level causes and effects based on (V)
is utterly straightforward and has already been anticipated in section 5. Instead of
stipulating that an event a is a cause of an event b if a is in some sense sufficient
or necessary for b, (V) paves the way for identifying a as a cause of b if a and b
instantiate two factors A and B, respectively, such that A is causally relevant to B.
More specifically, in light of (V) the following transition from general to singular
causation is at hand:
Singular causation (SC): An event a is a cause of an event b iff a instantiates a
factor A and b instantiates a factor B, such that
(a) A is causally relevant to B according to (V),
(b) a 6= b, and a and b occur within the same spatiotemporal frame, and
(c) a is coincident with other events that instantiate a minimally sufficient
condition X of B which is part of Φ and contains A.
As (V), this account of singular causation presupposes the admittedly vague
notions of a spatiotemporal frame and of coincidence. More is said about these
31 Cf. e.g. Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004).
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notions in the appendix. In order to see the main features and qualities of (SC),
however, an intuitive assessment of when events are spatiotemporally proximate
as opposed to distant will suffice. First, note that (SC) yields an irreflexive notion
of singular causation. Cause and effect events are required to differ. While event
types may be causally relevant to themselves, there is no self-causation on token
level. Second, (SC) does not exclude token level feedbacks. If there is a causally
interpretable minimal theory featuring A as a cause of B and another such theory
featuring B as a cause of A, a may be determined to cause b which, in turn, may
be determined to cause a by (SC). The existence of token level feedbacks is con-
troversial in the literature. Candidates for such feedbacks are e.g. static equilibria.
One of the most discussed examples of this kind is a stable house of cards. The
two cards at the top lean against each other. Each prevents the other from falling
over.32 The debate as to the causal nature of static equilibria shall not be entered
into here. Whatever the outcome will be, it seems plain that the question as to
whether the card example constitutes a case of token level feedback or not is not
to be decided on a priori conceptual grounds. The existence of simultaneous recip-
rocal singular causation is to be determined synthetically. (SC), accordingly, does
not rule out token level feedbacks. That means (SC) yields a non-symmetric, but
not an asymmetric notion of singular causation.
Apart from being non-committal with respect to the existence of causal feed-
backs on token level, (SC) has further notable merits. According to (SC), an event
a is only identified to cause an event b if a occurs along with all other events instan-
tiating a minimally sufficient condition AX1 of B. As a direct consequence of this
constraint, preempted potential causes of b are not identified as genuine causes of
b by (SC). Consider, for instance, the famous desert traveler one of whose enemies
drills a whole into his drinking bottle and another poisons the water in the bottle.33
The traveler then dies of thirst. The poisoning of the water is preempted by the
perforation of the bottle. (SC) indeed only identifies the latter event as a cause
of the traveler’s death, for crucial factors – as e.g. the drinking of the poisonous
water – in combination with which poisoning water only becomes lethal are not
instantiated in the desert traveler case.
Finally, reconsider the shipwreck of the Titanic. Even though Harold Bride’s
lighting of a Havana cigar, in the circumstance, is both sufficient and necessary
for the sinking of the Titanic, (SC) does not determine Bride’s action to cause the
end of the Titanic. There is no causally interpretable minimal theory Φ such that
Bride’s cigar lighting instantiates the antecedent of Φ and the sinking of the Titanic
instantiates Φ’s consequent. The accidental regularity between Shamus’ loss of
a tooth and his shipwreck is handled analogously. Shamus’ tooth loss does not
instantiate a factor which remains part of a minimal theory of shipwrecks across
arbitrary factor frame extensions. Contrary to a singularist regularity theory, thus,
32 Cf. e.g. Fair (1979), p. 230, Frankel (1986), and Hausman (1998), pp. 44-47.
33 Cf. Mackie (1974), pp. 44-46
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(SC) does not erroneously causally interpret accidental regularities among event
tokens.
9 Conclusion
Empty, single-case, and other accidental regularities, common cause structures and
the non-symmetry of general causation can all be adequately captured in regular-
ity theoretic terms. Regularity theories can do justice to the whole complexity of
generic causal structures. And all this is accomplished with simple recourse to ex-
tensional standard logic. Appropriate minimalization strategies are at hand such
that redundancies implicit in material conditionals – e.g. due to monotony – can
be efficaciously precluded from a causal interpretation. Characteristics of complex
causal nets can be resorted to in order to distinguish causal from spurious and ac-
cidental regularities. Finally, we have seen that a regularity theoretic analysis of
general causation can pave the way towards a straightforward account of singular
causation. All in all, this paper should have shown that regularity theories can be
conceived in a way that constitutes a promising and very intuitive alternative to
popular theoretical frameworks as implemented by counterfactual or probabilistic
analyses.
A APPENDIX: First-Order Formalization
This appendix introduces the first-order formalizations of the core notions involved
in a regularity theoretic account of general causation in the vein of (V). As indi-
cated in section 2, the reason for a first-order representation of causal regularities
lies in the relational constraints that distinguish causally interesting regularities
from causally meaningless regularities as “Whenever there is a table, there is a
table”. Causes and effects are instantiated by spatiotemporally proximate events,
causal regularities are instantiated by different events, and factors constituting a
complex cause are instantiated coincidently. These three relational constraints
characterizing causal regularities must be accounted for by first-order means. I
take them in turn.
A.1 Spatiotemporal Proximity of Causes and Effects
In accordance with Broad (1930), φ shall be defined to be a sufficient condition of
ψ iff (19) holds and a necessary condition of ψ iff (20) holds:
∀µ(φµ→ ψµ) (19)
∀µ(ψµ→ φµ) (20)
µ is to be read as a metavariable running over variables and φµ and ψµ stand for
any well-formed formulas with at least one free occurrence of µ.
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Instances of causes and instances of their effects do not occur anywhere and
anytime, but close by, i.e. within a certain spatiotemporal frame or within the same
situation. The interpretation of the relation “. . . occurs in the same spatiotemporal
frame as . . . ” cannot be fixed to a certain spatiotemporal interval independently of
a causal process under investigation. However, in order to make sure that no causal
element is covertly introduced into the notion of spatiotemporal proximity the lat-
ter shall be determined to be a symmetric relation, which – as mentioned above –
causal relevance clearly is not. Certain instances of causes and effects can be said
to be properly related only if they are in direct spatiotemporal contact, while in
other cases instances of causes may well occur far away from the instances of their
effects. The theory of Special Relativity only provides an upper bound for this in-
terval: Instances of causes must occur within the past light cones of the instances
of their effects. Notwithstanding this lacking specificity, given a concrete causal
process it is normally uncontroversial which events can be said to be properly re-
lated in order to be amenable to a causal interpretation.34 Moreover, whenever
spatiotemporal proximity is unsuitably interpreted for a given causal process, no
dependencies appear in corresponding empirical data.35
If minimally sufficient and minimally necessary conditions should, at least in
principle, be open for causal interpretations, the syntax of acceptable substitutions
in (19) and (20) must be restricted such that an instance x of a cause factor and
an instance y of an effect factor are required to occur in the same spatiotemporal
frame. In order to formally represent this spatiotemporal association, we introduce
the symmetric relation Rxy. This induces a first approximation to a first-order
representation of a causal regularity. Whoever claims that A is a (sufficient) cause
of B, claims that for all events x of type A there is an event y of type B such that
x and y occur in the same spatiotemporal frame. This is captured by (21).
∀x(Ax→ ∃y(By ∧ Rxy)) (21)
A.2 Causal vs. Semantic Regularities
(21) not only describes causal regularities, but also what might be referred to as
semantic regularities or regularities of set inclusion as “Whenever there is a soccer
34 If the striking of a match in Switzerland is followed by a match catching fire in England, it
is clear that, even if the interval between these two events is thus that they are not excluded to be
causally related by Special Relativity, the striking in Switzerland does not cause the light in England.
On the other hand, given a concrete run of an experiment, say a number of substances are brought
together in a test tube, it is commonly presumed that no events occurring in the course of this run
are excluded from a causal dependency due to inadequate spatiotemporal relatedness. Accordingly,
whenever the spatiotemporal relation between singular causes and effects is explicitly discussed in
theoretical accounts of causation, it is commonly left as unspecified as possible (cf. e.g. Xu (1997),
p. 159-160.)
35 As I show in Baumgartner (forthcoming), ch. 5, the relation “. . . occurs in the same spatiotem-
poral frame as . . . ” can be suitably interpreted by means of a kind of trial-error procedure for every
causal context under investigation.
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game, there is a sport event”. A semantic regularity is given in case of two predi-
cates one of which has an extension that is included in the extension of the other.
Accordingly, by satisfying the first of these predicates an object or event eo ipso
satisfies the other predicate. As single objects or events are moreover spatiotempo-
rally proximate to themselves, one and the same object or event satisfies antecedent
and consequent of a semantic regularity. The soccer games and the sport events are
identical, thus, they certainly are spatiotemporally proximate according to any spa-
tiotemporal interval chosen as interpretation of R. In order to exclude semantic
regularities from consideration when it comes to causal analyses, it must be stip-
ulated that instances of causes differ from the instances of their effects. No token
event ever causes itself. Hence, (21) must be specified such that all models of the
specified formula feature different events as instances of the factors contained in
antecedent and consequent, respectively:
∀x(Ax→ ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ x 6= y)) (22)
(22) states that for all events x of typeA there is a different event y of typeB in the
same spatiotemporal frame as x. In order to conveniently abbreviate our notation,
we introduce “7→”:
Z1 7→ Z2 =df ∀x(Z1x→ ∃y(Z2y ∧ x 6= y ∧ Rxy)) (23)
A.3 Coincidence
The factors of a complex cause only become causally effective if coincidently in-
stantiated. Hence, the factors contained in a minimally sufficient condition must
be required to be coincidently instantiated. In order to symbolically represent co-
incident instantiations, I introduce the n-ary relation K with n being the number
of conjuncts in a minimally sufficient condition apart from K itself. K subsists
among the instances of the factors in a minimally sufficient condition iff these
factors are coincidently instantiated. K can be seen on a par with any ordinary
non-redundant factor within a minimally sufficient condition. If K does not hold
among the instances of a conjunction of factors, the instantiations of these factors
are not sufficient for the effect to occur. Thus, in contrast to R, K may remain
uninterpreted.
Only the subset of minimally sufficient conditions that include K can possi-
bly be causally interpreted. A possibly causally interpretable minimally sufficient
condition is of the form:
∀x1∀x2 . . .∀xn(A1x1 ∧A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧Anxn ∧Kx1x2 . . . xn →
∃y(By ∧ x1 6= y ∧ x2 6= y ∧ . . . ∧ xn 6= y ∧ Rx1x2 . . . xny))
(24)
As (24) demonstrates, the factors of a possibly causally interpretable minimally
sufficient condition are not required to be instantiated by the same event. As long
as they occur coincidently, factors in a complex cause may well be instantiated by
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different events. The complexity of (24), which describes a minimally sufficient
condition by explicitly mentioning three factors only, apparently calls for further
abbreviations. To this end we adopt the convention that a conjunction of factors
whose instances are related in terms of K shall simply be concatenated without
conjunctor and without explicit mention ofK. A universally or existentially quan-
tified conjunction of factorsA1x1∧A2x2∧. . .∧Anxn∧Kx1x2 . . . xn, accordingly,
is represented by A1A2 . . . An.
A1A2 . . . An =df A1x1 ∧A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧Anxn ∧Kx1x2 . . . xn (25)
The quantifiers that bind the variables on the right-hand side of (25) can be left
unspecified, because this abbreviated notation is only used in connection with “7→”,
whose antecedent is determined to be universally quantified and whose consequent
is existentially quantified by definition. Therefore, the context in which expressions
of type A1A2 . . . An appear always clarifies the nature of the quantifiers involved.
Given this notational convention, (24) can be transparently stated thus:
A1A2 . . . An 7→ B
A.4 Minimal Theory
Before minimal theories can be formally represented, the abbreviated notation ini-
tiated in the previous sections needs to be extended. Minimally sufficient and min-
imally necessary conditions have been defined as (finite) open conjunctions and
disjunctions. In order to account for that openness, two types of variables run-
ning over factors shall be introduced. For conjunctions of unknown or unspecified
factors within sufficient conditions we shall implement the variables X1, X2, etc.
Thus, theseX-variables are to be read as running over factors that are not explicitly
integrated within sufficient conditions.
Xi =df Z1x1 ∧ Z2x2 ∧ Z3x3 ∧ . . . ∧ Znxn, n ≥ 1,
with i = 1, 2, 3, . . ., the variablesZ1 . . . Zn running over factors, and quantification
depending on whether Xi appears right or left of “7→”.
Building on the definition of Xi, we define the variables YA, YB , etc. to rep-
resent disjunctions whose disjuncts are not explicitly integrated within necessary
conditions. The subscripts in case of the Y -variables correspond to the factors
whose necessary condition a respective Y -variable complements.
Yx =df X1 ∨X2 ∨X3 ∨ . . . ∨Xn, n ≥ 1,
with x = A,B,C, . . . and quantification equally depending on whether Yx appears
right or left of “ 7→”.
With these notational means at hand, a factorA being part of a sufficient condi-
tion ofB, such that this sufficient condition, in turn, is part of a necessary condition
of B can be expressed by (26).
(AX1 ∨ YB 7→ B) ∧ (B 7→ AX1 ∨ YB) (26)
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(26) states that whenever A is instantiated coincidently with other factors X1,
the factor B is instantiated in the same spatiotemporal frame by an event that dif-
fers from the instances of AX1, and whenever B is instantiated, there is either
a coincident instantiation of AX1 or one of the disjuncts in the domain of YB is
instantiated in the same spatiotemporal frame, such that the instances of B and
of AX1 ∨ YB differ. (26) can thus be seen as an abbreviation of expressions of
the form of (27), where the incompleteness is indicated by dots instead of X- and
Y -variables and k and i stand for arbitrary natural numbers.36
∀x1...∀xi((A1x1∧A2x2∧...∧Aixi∧Kx1x2...xi)→∃y(By∧x1 6=y∧...∧xi 6=y∧Rx1...xiy))∧
...∧∀x1...∀xk((Z1x1∧Z2x2∧...∧Zkxk∧Kx1x2...xk)→∃y(By∧x1 6=y∧...∧xk 6=y∧Rx1...xky))∧
∀y(By→(∃x1...∃xi(A1x1∧A2x2∧...∧Aixi∧Kx1x2...xi∧x1 6=y∧...∧xi 6=y∧Rx1...xiy)∨
...∨∃x1...∃xk(Z1x1∧Z2x2∧...∧Zkxk∧Kx1x2...xk∧x1 6=y∧...∧xk 6=y∧Rx1...xky)))
(27)
Note that (26) and (27) do not yet express a minimal theory of B. In order to
turn (26) and (27) into a minimal theory, it has to be guaranteed that both sufficient
and necessary conditions are minimal. A first and crucial step in this direction is
done in (28).
(AX1 ∨ YB 7→ B) ∧ ¬(A 7→ B) ∧ ¬(X1 7→ B)∧
(B 7→ AX1 ∨ YB) ∧ ¬(B 7→ AX1) ∧ ¬(B 7→ YB)
(28)
(28) stipulates thatA is non-redundantly contained in a minimally sufficient condi-
tion AX1 of B such that AX1 is non-redundantly contained in a minimally neces-
sary condition ofB. If it is furthermore granted that YB only consists of minimally
sufficient conditions which are all part of a minimally necessary condition ofB, we
arrive at the called for complete minimalization of (26) and (27). Since expressions
of type (28), whose Yx is minimalized in this vein, constitute the core concept of
a regularity theory along the lines of (V), they are abbreviated by expressions of
type (29).
AX1 ∨ YB ⇒ B (29)
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